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Abstract
Agents are small programs that autonomously take actions based on
changes in their environment or “state.” Over the last few years, there
have been an increasing number of efforts to build agents that can interact
and/or collaborate with other agents. In one of these efforts, Eiter, Sub-
rahmanian, and Pick (1999) have shown how agents may be built on top of
legacy code. However, their framework assumes that agent states are com-
pletely determined, and there is no uncertainty in an agent’s state. Thus,
their framework allows an agent developer to specify how his agents will
react when the agent is 100% sure about what is true/false in the world
state. In this paper, we propose the concept of a probabilistic agent pro-
gram and show how, given an arbitrary program written in any imperative
language, we may build a declarative “probabilistic” agent program on top
of it which supports decision making in the presence of uncertainty. We
provide two alternative semantics for probabilistic agent programs. We
show that the second semantics, though more epistemically appealing, is
more complex to compute. We provide sound and complete algorithms to
compute the semantics of positive agent programs.
∗Most proofs are contained in the appendix.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few years, there has been increasing interest in the area of soft-
ware agents. Such agents provide a wide variety of services including identi-
fication of interesting newspaper articles, software robots that perform tasks
(and plan) on a user’s behalf, content based routers, agent based telecommu-
nication applications, and solutions to logistics applications. IMPACT (see
|http://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/impact/—) is a multinational project whose
aim is to define a formal theory of software agents, implement (appropriate
fragments of) the theory efficiently, and develop an appropriate suite of appli-
cations on top of this implementation. An IMPACT agent manages a set of
data types/structures (including a message box) through a set of application
program interface (API) function calls. The state of the agent at a given point
in time is a set of objects belonging to these data types. Each agent has a set of
integrity constraints that its state must always satisfy. When an agent’s state
changes (due to external events such as receipt of a message), the agent tries to
modify its state so that the integrity constraints are satisfied. To do this, it has
a suite of actions, and an agent program that specifies the operating principles
(what is permitted, what is forbidden, what is obligatory, etc., and under what
conditions?). (Eiter, Subrahmanian, and Pick 1999; Eiter and Subrahmanian
1999) provides a detailed study of the semantics and complexity of such agents,
(Eiter, Subrahmanian, and Rogers 1999) contains compile-time and run-time
algorithms, while (Arisha, Ozcan, Ross, Subrahmanian, Eiter, and Kraus 1999)
focuses on system architecture.
Past work on IMPACT assumes that all agents reason with a complete and
certain view of the world. However, in many real world applications, agents
have only a partial, uncertain view of what is true in the world. Though an
agent may need to reason about uncertainty for many reasons, in this paper,
we will assume that the main cause of uncertainty in an agent is due to its
state being uncertain. For example, when an image processing agent is asked
to identify an enemy vehicle, it might return the fact that vehicle v1 is a T72
tank (with 60–70% probability) and a T-80 tank (with 20-45% probability).
However, this raises several problems, the first of which is that as an action
can only be executed if its precondition is true in the current state, if the agent
doesn’t know what the state is, then it cannot determine which of its actions
are executable, and which are not. Second, even if an action is executable, the
state that results may not be precisely determinable either. One consequence of
all this is that the semantics of agent programs change significantly when such
uncertainties arise.
The main contributions (and organization) of this paper may now be summed
up as follows.
1. In Section 2, we present a brief overview of agents (without any uncertainty
involved) as described in (Eiter, Subrahmanian, and Pick 1999).
2. Then, in Section 3, we define the concept of a probabilistic code call, which
is the basic syntactic construct through which uncertainty in abstract data
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types manifests itself.
3. In Section 4, we define the syntax of probabilistic agent programs. Specif-
ically, we show that probabilistic agent programs allow an agent developer
to specify the permissions, obligations, forbidden actions, etc. associated
with an agent depending not only on the probabilities that certain con-
ditions hold in the agent’s state, but also on the developer’s assumptions
about the relationship between these conditions (e.g. the probability that
a conjunction holds in a given state depends not only on the probabilities
of the conjuncts involved, but also on the dependencies if any between the
conjuncts).
4. In Section 5, we develop three formal semantics for probabilistic agent
programs which extend each other as well as the semantics for (ordinary,
non probabilistic) agent programs defined by Eiter, Subrahmanian, and
Pick (1999). We also provide results relating these diverse semantics.
5. Then, in Section 6, we develop a sound and complete algorithm to compute
the semantics defined when only positive agent programs are considered.
We also show that the classical agent programs of Eiter, Subrahmanian,
and Pick (1999) are a special case of our probabilistic programs.
6. In Section 7, we provide an alternative, Kripke style semantics for agent
programs. In contrast to the previous “family” of semantics which assume
that an agent’s precondition must be true with 100% probability for the
agent to execute it, this semantics also allows an agent to execute it when
it is not sure (with 100% probability) that the action’s precondition is
true. We extend all three semantics of agent programs defined earlier in
Section 5 to handle these intuitions. Unfortunately, as we show in this
section, this desire for a “more sophisticated” sematics comes at a high
computational price.
2 Preliminaries
In IMPACT, each agent a is built on top of a body of software code (built in any
programming language) that supports a well defined application programmer
interface (either part of the code itself, or developed to augment the code).
Hence, associated with each agent a is a body of software code Sa defined as
follows.
Definition 2.1 (Software Code) We may characterize the code on top of
which an agent is built as a triple S =def (TS ,FS , CS) where:
1. TS is the set of all data types managed by S,
2. FS is a set of predefined functions which makes access to the data objects
managed by the agent available to external processes, and
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3. CS is a set of type composition operations. A type composition operator
is a partial n-ary function c which takes types τ1, . . . , τn as input, and
yields a type c(τ1, . . . , τn) as output. As c is a partial function, c may
only be defined for certain arguments τ1, . . . , τn, i.e., c is not necessarily
applicable on arbitrary types.
When a is clear from context, we will often drop the superscript a. Intuitively,
TS is the set of all data types managed by a, FS is the set of all function
calls supported by S’s application programmer interface (API). CS is the set of
ways of creating new data types from existing data types. This characterization
of a piece of software code is widely used (cf. the Object Data Management
Group’s ODMG standard (Cattell, R. G. G., et al. 1997) and the CORBA
framework (Siegal 1996)). Each agent also has a message box having a well
defined set of associated code calls that can be invoked by external programs.
Example 2.2 [Surveillance Example] Consider a surveillance application where
there are hundreds of (identical) surveillance agents, and a geographic agent.
The data types associated with the surveillance and geographic agent include
the standard int,bool,real,string,file data types, plus those shown below:
Surveillance Agent Geographic Agent
image:record of
imageid:file;
day:date;
time:int;
location:string
imagedb: setof image;
map:↑ quadtree;
quadtree:record of
place:string;
xcoord:int;
ycoord:int;
pop:int
nw,ne,sw,se:↑ quadtree
A third agent may well merge information from these two agents, tracking a
sequence of surveillance events.
The surv agent may support a function surv : identify() which takes as input,
an image, and returns as output, the set of all identified vehicles in it. It may
also support a function called surv : turret() that takes as input, a vehicle id, and
returns as output, the type of gun-turret it has. Likewise, the geo agent may
support a function geo : getplnode() which takes as input a map and the name
of a place and returns the set of all nodes with that name as the place-field,
a function geo : getxynode() which takes as input a map and the coordinates
of a place and returns the set of all nodes with that coordinate as the node,
a function called geo : range() that takes as input a map, an x, y coordinate
pair, and a distance r and returns as output, the set of all nodes in the map
(quadtree) that are within r units of location (x, y).
Throughout this paper, we will expand on this simple example and use it to
illustrate and motivate the various definitions in the paper.
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loc1    50,50
   Loc2  55,40
   Loc 3   53,45
   Loc 4  52,60   Loc5   37,42
Figure 1: Example quadtree for Surveillance Application.
Definition 2.3 (State of an Agent) The state of an agent at any given point
t in time, denoted OS(t), consists of the set of all instantiated data objects of
types contained in T aS .
An agent’s state may change because it took an action, or because it received
a message. Throughout this paper we will assume that except for appending
messages to an agent a’s mailbox, another agent b cannot directly change a’s
state. However, it might do so indirectly by shipping the other agent a message
requesting a change.
Example 2.4 For example, the state of the Geographic Agent may consist of
two quadtrees (one of which, map1, is shown in Figure 1), and the type “map”
may contain two objects, map1, and map2, pointing to these two quadtrees,
respectively. (The figure doesn’t show population values explicitly. Assume the
population values are 20,000 for Loc1, 28,000 for Loc2, 15,000 for Loc3, and
40,000 for Loc4, and 8000 for Loc5.)
Queries and/or conditions may be evaluated w.r.t. an agent state using the
notion of a code call atom and a code call condition defined below.
Definition 2.5 (Code Call/Code Call Atom) If S is the name of a soft-
ware package, f is a function defined in this package, and (d1, . . . , dn) is a
tuple of arguments of the input type of f , then S : f (d1, . . . , dn) is called a code
call.
If cc is a code call, and X is either a variable symbol or an object of the
output type of cc, then in(X, cc) is called a code call atom.
For instance, in the Surveillance example, geo : getplnode(map1, "Loc1") returns
the set containing just the single node referring to Loc1 in Figure 1. Likewise,
the code call geo : range(map1, 55, 50, 11) returns the set containing the nodes
labeled Loc1 and Loc2.
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Definition 2.6 (Code Call Condition) A code call condition χ is defined as
follows:
1. Every code call atom is a code call condition.
2. If s, t are either variables or objects, then s = t is a code call condition.
3. If s, t are either integers/real valued objects, or are variables over the
integers/reals, then s < t, s > t, s ≥ t, s ≤ t are code call conditions.
4. If χ1, χ2 are code call conditions, then χ1 &χ2 is a code call condition.
A code call condition satisfying any of the first three criteria above is an atomic
code call condition.
An example code call condition is shown below.
Example 2.7 in(X, geo : range(map1, 55, 50, 11))&X.pop > 25, 000 is a code
call condition that is satisfied by only one node in map1, viz. the Loc2 node.
Each agent has an associated set of integrity constraints—only states that
satisfy these constraints are considered to be valid or legal states. An integrity
constraint is an implication whose consequent is a code call atom, and whose
antecedent is a code call condition. Appendix A contains a detailed definition.
Each agent has an action-base describing various actions that the agent is
capable of executing. Actions change the state of the agent and perhaps the
state of other agents’ msgboxes. As in classical AI, all actions have an associated
precondition (a code call condition that the agent state must satisfy for the
action to be executable) and an add/delete list. Appendix A contains detailed
definitions from (Eiter, Subrahmanian, and Pick 1999).
For instance, the geo agent may have an insert action that adds a node to
the map. Likewise, the surv agent may also have an insert action which inserts
a new image into the image database. Both these agents also have an action
that sends a message.
Each agent has an associated “notion of concurrency,” conc, which a set
of actions and an agent state as input, and produces as output, a single action
that reflects the combination of all the input actions. (Eiter, Subrahmanian, and
Pick 1999) provides examples of three different notions of concurrency. We will
sometimes abuse notation write conc(S,O) to denote the new state obtained
by concurrently executing the actions in S in state O.
Each agent has an associated set of action constraints that define the cir-
cumstances under which certain actions may be concurrently executed. As at
any given point t in time, many sets of actions may be concurrently executable,
each agent has an Agent Program that determines what actions the agent can
take, what actions the agent cannot take, and what actions the agent must take.
Agent programs are defined in terms of status atoms defined below.
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Definition 2.8 (Status Atom/Status Set) If α(~t) is an action, and Op ∈
{P,F,W,Do ,O}, then Opα(~t) is called a status atom. If A is an action status
atom, then A,¬A are called status literals. A status set is a finite set of ground
status atoms.
Intuitively, Pα means α is permitted, Fα means α is forbidden, Doα means α
is actually done, and Wα means that the obligation to perform α is waived.
Definition 2.9 (Agent Program) An agent program P is a finite set of rules
of the form
A ← χ&L1& . . .&Ln
where χ is a code call condition and L1, . . . , Ln are status literals.
The semantics of agent programs are well described in (Eiter, Subrahmanian,
and Pick 1999; Eiter and Subrahmanian 1999)—due to space reasons, we do not
explicitly recapitulate them here, though Appendix A contains a brief overview
of the semantics.
3 Probabilistic Code Calls
Consider a code call of the form d : f (args). This code call returns a set of
objects. If an object o is returned by such a code call, then this means that
o is definitely in the result of evaluating d : f (args). However, there are many
cases, particularly in applications involving reasoning about knowledge, where
a code call may need to return an “uncertain” answer. In our our surveillance
example, surv : identify(image1) tries to identify all objects in a given image—
however, it is well known that image identification is an uncertain task. Some
objects may be identified with 100% certainty, while in other cases, it may only
be possible to say it is either a T72 tank with 40–50% probability, or a T80
tank with (50-60%) probability.
Definition 3.1 (Random Variable of Type τ) A random variable of type
τ is a finite set RV of objects of type τ , together with a probability distribution
℘ that assigns real numbers in the unit interval [0, 1] to members of RV such
that Σo∈RV℘(o) ≤ 1.
It is important to note that in classical probability theory (Ross 1997), random
variables satisfy the stronger requirement that Σo∈RV℘(o) = 1. However, in
many real life situations, a probability distribution may have missing pieces,
which explains why we have chosen a weaker definition. However, the classi-
cal probability case when Σo∈RV℘(o) = 1 is an instance of our more general
definition.
Definition 3.2 (Probabilistic Code Call a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn))
Suppose a : f (d1, . . . , dn) is a code call whose output type is τ . The probabilistic
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code call associated with a : f (d1, . . . , dn), denoted a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn), returns
a set of random variables of type τ when executed on state O.
The following example illustrates the use of probabilistic code calls.
Example 3.3 Consider the code call surv : identify(image1). This code call
may return the following two random variables.
〈{t72, t80}, {〈t72, 0.5〉, 〈t80, 0.4〉}〉 and 〈{t60, t84}, {〈t60, 0.3〉, 〈t84, 0.7〉}〉
This says that the image processing algorithm has identified two objects in
image1. The first object is either a T72 or a T80 tank with 50% and 40%
probability, respectively, while the second object is either a T60 or a T84 tank
with 30% and 70% probability respectively.
Probabilistic code calls and code call conditions look exactly like ordinary code
calls and code call conditions — however, as a probabilistic code call returns
a set of random variables, probabilistic code call atoms are true or false with
some probability.
Example 3.4 Consider the probabilistic code call condition
in(X, surv :RV identify(image1))& in(A1, surv :RV turret(X)).
This code call condition attempts to find all vehicles in “image1” with a gun
turret of type A1. Let us suppose that the first code call returns just one
random variable specifying that image1 contains one vehicle which is either a
T72 (probability 50%) or a T80 tank (probability 40%). When this random
variable (X) is passed to the second code call, it returns one random variable
with two values—A1 with probability 30% and A2 with probability 65%. What
is the probability that the code call condition above is satisfied by a particular
assignment to X?
The answer to this question depends very much upon the knowledge we have
(if any) about the dependencies between the identification of a tank as a T-72
or a T-80, and the type of gun turret on these. For instance, if we know that all
T72’s have A2 type turrets, then the probability of the conjunct being true when
X is a T72 tank is 0. On the other hand, it may be that the turret identification
and the vehicle identification are independent for T80s—hence, when X is set
to T80, the probability of the conjunct being true is 0.4× 0.3 = 0.12.
Unfortunately, this is not the only problem. Other problems also arise, as shown
in the following example.
Example 3.5 Suppose we consider a code call χ returning the following two
random variables.
RV1 = 〈{a, b}, ℘1〉
RV2 = 〈{b, c}, ℘2〉
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Suppose ℘1(a) = 0.9, ℘1(b) = 0.1, ℘2(b) = 0.8, ℘2(c) = 0.1. What is the proba-
bility that b is in the result of the code call χ?
Answering this question is problematic. The reason is that we are told that
there are at most two objects returned by χ. One of these objects is either a or b,
and the other is either b or c. This leads to four possibilities, depending on which
of these is true. The situation is further complicated because in some cases,
knowing that the first object is b may preclude the second object from being
b—this would occur, for instance, if χ examines photographs each containing
two different people and provides identifications for each. a, b and c may be
potential id’s of such people returned by the image processing program. In such
cases, the same person can never be pictured with himself or herself.
Of course, in other cases, there may be no reason to believe that knowing
the value of one of two objects tells us anything about the value of the second
object. For example if we replace people with colored cubes (with a denoting
amber cubes, b black, and c cyan), there is no reason to believe that two identical
black cubes cannot be pictured next to each other.
One could argue, however, that the above reasoning is incorrect because if two
objects are completely identical, then they must be the same. This means
that if we have two distinct black cubes, then these two black cubes must be
distinguishable from one another via some property such as their location in
the photo, or their Ids. This is Leibniz’s well known extensionality principle.
Hence, we will require the results of a probabilistic code call to be coherent in
the following sense.
Definition 3.6 (Coherent Probabilistic Code Call) A probabilistic code call
is coherent iff for all distinct 〈X1, ℘1〉, 〈X2, ℘2〉, X1 ∩ X2 = ∅.
Throughout this paper, only coherent probabilistic code calls are considered.
Thus, the expression “probabilistic code call” assumes coherence.
Definition 3.7 (Satisfying a Code Call Atom) Suppose a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn)
is a ground probabilistic code call and o is an object of the output type of this
code call w.r.t. agent state O. Suppose [ℓ, u] is a closed subinterval of the unit
interval [0, 1].
• o |=
[ℓ,u]
O in(X, a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn))
if there is a (Y, ℘) in the answer returned by evaluating a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn)
w.r.t. O such that o ∈ Y and ℓ ≤ ℘(o) ≤ u.
• o |=
[ℓ,u]
O not in(X, a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn))
if for all random variables (Y, ℘) returned by evaluating a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn)
w.r.t. O, either o /∈ Y or ℘(o) /∈ [ℓ, u].
Probabilistic code call conditions are defined in exactly the same way as code
call conditions. However, extending the above definition of “satisfaction” to
probabilistic code call conditions is highly problematic because (as shown in
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Examples 3.4 and 3.5), the probability that a conjunction is true depends not
only on the probabilities of the individual conjuncts, but also on the dependen-
cies between the events denoted by these conjuncts. The notion of a probabilistic
conjunction strategy defined below captures these different ways of computing
probabilities via an abstract definition.
Definition 3.8 (Probabilistic Conjunction Strategy ⊗)
A probabilistic conjunction strategy is a mapping ⊗ which maps a pair of prob-
ability intervals to a single probability interval satisfying the following axioms:
1. Bottomline: [L1, U1]⊗[L2, U2] ≤ [min(L1, L2),min(U1, U2)] where [x, y] ≤
[x′, y′] if x ≤ x′ and y ≤ y′.
2. Ignorance: [L1, U1]⊗ [L2, U2] ⊆ [max(0, L1 + L2 − 1),min(U1, U2)].
3. Identity: When (e1 ∧ e2) is consistent and [L2, U2] = [1, 1], [L1, U1] ⊗
[L2, U2] = [L1, U1].
4. Annihilator: [L1, U1]⊗ [0, 0] = [0, 0].
5. Commutativity: [L1, U1]⊗ [L2, U2] = [L2, U2]⊗ [L1, U1].
6. Associativity: ([L1, U1] ⊗ [L2, U2]) ⊗ [L3, U3] = [L1, U1] ⊗ ([L2, U2] ⊗
[L3, U3]).
7. Monotonicity: [L1, U1] ⊗ [L2, U2] ≤ [L1, U1] ⊗ [L3, U3] if [L2, U2] ≤
[L3, U3].
Intuitively, in the above definition, [L1, U1], [L2, U2] are intervals in which the
probability of events e1, e2 are known to lie, and [L1, U1] ⊗ [L2, U2] returns a
probability range for the co-occurrence of both these events. The Bottomline
axiom says that the probability of the conjunct is smaller than the probabilities
of the individual events. When we know nothing about the relationship between
the events e1, e2, Boole (1854) has shown that the probability of the conjunc-
tion must lie in the interval [max(0, L1 + L2 − 1),min(U1, U2)]. This is what
is stated in the Ignorance axiom. The identity and annihilator axioms specify
what happens when one of the events is deterministic (i.e. not probabilistic).
The axioms of commutativity and associativity are self explanatory. The mono-
tonicity axiom says that if we sharpen the probability range of one of the two
events, then the probability range of the conjunctive event is also sharpened.
The concept of a conjunction strategy is very general, and has as special
cases, the following well known ways of combining probabilities.
1. When we do not know the dependencies between e1, e2, we may use the
conjunction strategy ⊗ig defined as ([L1, U1]⊗ig [L2, U2]) ≡ [max(0, L1 +
L2 − 1),min(U1, U2)].
2. When e1, e2 have maximal overlap, use the positive correlation conjunctive
strategy⊗pc defined as ([L1, U1]⊗pc [L2, U2]) ≡ [min(L1, L2),min(U1, U2)].
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3. When e1, e2 have minimal overlap, use the negative correlation conjunc-
tive strategy ⊗nc defined as ([L1, U1] ⊗nc [L2, U2]) ≡ [max(0, L1 + L2 −
1),max(0, U1 + U2 − 1)].
4. When the two events occur independently, use the independence conjunc-
tion strategy ([L1, U1]⊗in [L2, U2]) = [L1 · L2, U1 · U2].
4 Probabilistic Agent Programs: Syntax
We are now ready to define the syntax of a probabilistic agent program (pap
for short). This syntax builds upon the well studied annotated logic paradigm
proposed by(Subrahmanian 1987), and later studied extensively (Kifer and Sub-
rahmanian 1992; Ng and Subrahmanian 1993b; Ng and Subrahmanian 1993a).
4.1 Annotation Syntax
We assume the existence of an annotation language Lann—the constant symbols
of Lann are the real numbers in the unit interval [0, 1]. In addition, Lann
contains a finite set of function symbols, each with an associated arity, and
a (possibly infinite) set of variable symbols, ranging over the unit interval [0, 1].
All function symbols are pre-interpreted in the sense that associated with each
function symbol f of arity k is a fixed function from [0, 1]k to [0, 1].
Definition 4.1 (Annotation Item) We define annotation items inductively
as follows:
• Every constant and every variable of Lann is an annotation item.
• If f is an annotation function of arity n and ai1, . . . , ain are annotation
items, then f(ai1, . . . , ain) is an annotation item.
An annotation item is ground if no annotation variables occur in it.
For instance, 0, 0.9, (V +0.9), (V +0.9)2 are all annotation items if V is a variable
in Lann and “+”, “ˆ” are annotation functions of arity 2.
Definition 4.2 (Annotation [ai1, ai2]) If ai1, ai2 are annotation items, then
[ai1, ai2] is an annotation. If ai1, ai2 are both ground, then [ai1, ai2] is a ground
annotation.
For instance, [0, 0.4], [0.7, 0.9], [0.1, V2 ], [
V
4 ,
V
2 ] are all annotations. The annota-
tion [0.1, V2 ] denotes an interval only when a value in [0, 1] is assigned to the
variable V .
Definition 4.3 (Annotated Code Call Condition χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉) If χ is
a probabilistic code call condition, ⊗ is a conjunction strategy, and [ai1, ai2]
is an annotation, then χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 is an annotated code call condition.
χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 is ground if there are no variables in either χ or in [ai1, ai2].
11
Intuitively, the ground annotated code call condition χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 says that
the probability of χ being true (under conjunction strategy⊗) lies in the interval
[ai1, ai2]. For example, when X,A1 are ground,
in(X, surv :RV identify(image1))& in(A1, surv :RV turret(X)) : 〈[0.3, 0.5],⊗ig〉
is true if and only if the probability that X is identified by the surv agent and
that the turret is identified as being of type A1 lies between 30 and 50% assuming
that nothing is known about the dependencies between turret identifications and
identifications of objects by surv.
We are now ready to define the concept of a probabilistic agent program.
Definition 4.4 (Probabilistic Agent Programs PP) Suppose Γ is a con-
junction of annotated code calls, and A,L1, . . . , Ln are action status atoms.
Then
A← Γ, L1, . . . , Ln (1)
is a probabilistic action rule. For such a rule r, we use B+as(r) to denote the
positive action status atoms in {L1, . . . , Ln}, and B
−
as(r) to denote the set of
negative action status liters in {L1, . . . , Ln}.
A probabilistic agent program is a finite set of probabilistic action rules.
A simple example of a probabilistic agent program is given below.
Example 4.5 [Probabilistic Agent Program] Consider an intelligent sensor agent
that is performing surveillance tasks. The following rules specify a small pap
that such an agent might use.
Do send warn(X) ← in(F, surv :file(imagedb))&
in(X, surv :RV identify(F))&
in(A1, surv :RV turret(X))) : 〈[0.7, 1.0],⊗ig〉
¬Fsend warn(X).
Fsend warn(X) ← in(X, surv :RV identify(F))&
in(L, geo :RV getplnode(X.location))&
in(L, geo :RV range(100, 100, 20)).
This agent operates according to two very simple rules. The first rule says
that it sends a warning whenever it identifies an enemy vehicle as having a gun
turret of type A1 with over 70% probability, as long as sending such a warning
is not forbidden. The second rule says that sending a warning is forbidden if
the enemy vehicle is within 20 units of distance from location (100,100).
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5 Probabilistic Agent Programs: Semantics
We are now ready to define the semantics of paps. The semantics of paps will
be defined via the concept of a probabilistic status set (defined below).
Definition 5.1 (Probabilistic Status Set PS) A probabilistic status set is
any set PS of ground action status atoms over S. For any operator Op ∈
{P,Do ,F,O,W}, we denote by Op(PS) the set {α | Op(α) ∈ PS}. Similarly,
we use ¬PS to denote the set {¬A | A ∈ PS}.
It will turn out that given any probabilistic agent program, and an (uncertain)
agent state evaluated using probabilistic code calls, the meaning of the pap w.r.t.
the state may be defined via a set of probabilistic status sets that have some
desirable properties. These properties fall into three broad categories:
1. the probabilistic status set must be “closed” under the rules in the pap;
2. the probabilistic status set must be deontically consistent (e.g. it cannot
require something to be both permitted and forbidden) and it must not
violate the action constraints;
3. the probabilistic status set must not lead to a new state that violates the
integrity constraints associated with the agent;
5.1 Satisfaction of Annotated Formulae
In this section, we define what it means for an agent state to satisfy an annotated
code call condition.
Definition 5.2 (Satisfying an Annotated Code Call Condition) Suppose
O is an agent state, and χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 is a ground annotated code call condi-
tion. O is said to satisfy χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉, denoted O |=[ai1,ai2] χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉
iff:
• χ is of the form o = o (where o is an object), or
• χ is of the form r1 < r2, where r1, r2 are real numbers (or integers) such
that r1 is less than r2, or
• χ is of the form in(X, a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn)) and o |=
[ai1,ai2]
O in(X, a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn)),
or
• χ is of the form not in(o, a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn)) and the following holds
o |=
[ai1,ai2]
O not in(X, a :RV f (d1, . . . , dn)), or
• χ is of the form χ1 ∧ χ2 and [ℓ1, u1], [ℓ2, u2] are the tightest intervals such
that O |=[ℓ1,u1] χ1 and O |=[ℓ2,u2] χ2 and [ai1, ai2] ⊇ [ℓ1, u1]⊗ [ℓ2, u2].
O is said to satisfy a non-ground annotated code call χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 iff O
satisfies all ground instances of χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉.
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5.2 Closure and AppPP,OS(PS)
We may associate with any pap PP, an operator AppPP,OS (PS) which maps
probabilistic status sets to probabilistic status sets.
Definition 5.3 (Operator AppPP,OS (PS)) Suppose PP is a probabilistic agent
program, OS is an agent state, and PS is a probabilistic status set. Then
AppPP,OS (PS) = {Opα | Opα is the head of a ground instance r of a rule
in PP satisfying the 4 conditions below }
1. B+as(r) ⊆ PS and ¬.B
−
as(r) ∩ PS = ∅, and
2. For every annotated code call condition χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 in the body of r,
it is the case that OS |=
[ai1,ai2] χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 and
3. if Op ∈ {P,O,Do }, then OS |=[1,1] Pre(α) and
4. for every action status atom of the form Opβ in B+as(r) such that Op ∈
{P,O,Do }, OS |=
[1,1] Pre(β).
The first part of this definition says that for a rule to fire, the action status atoms
in its body must be “true” w.r.t. PS. The second condition says that annotated
code call conditions in a rule body must be satisfied in the current object state
for the rule to fire. The third part is more tricky. It says that if Oα or Doα
or Pα is in the head of a rule, then for the rule to fire, the precondition of the
action must be true with 100% probability. The final condition is similar w.r.t.
to positive action status atoms in the body. Thus, for now, we are assuming that
for an agent to perform an action (or even be permitted to perform an action),
it must be 100% sure that the action’s precondition is true (later in Section 8, we
will provide an alternate, more complex semantics that does not require this).
Definition 5.4 (Closure under Program Rules) PS is said to be closed
under the rules of pap PP in state Op iff AppPP,OS (PS) ⊆ PS.
5.3 Deontic/Action Consistency/Closure
The concept of deontic/action consistency requires that probabilistic status sets
satisfy the agent’s action constraints and commonsense axioms about deontic
modalities.
Definition 5.5 (Deontic and Action Consistency) A probabilistic status set
PS is deontically consistent with respect to an agent state O iff it satisfies the
following rules for any ground action α:
• If Oα ∈ PS, then Wα /∈ PS.
• If Pα ∈ PS, then Fα /∈ PS.
• If Pα ∈ PS, then O |=[1,1] Pre(α).
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A probabilistic status set PS is action consistent w.r.t. O iff for every action
constraint of the form
{α1( ~X1), . . . , αk( ~Xk)} ←֓ χ (2)
either O 6|=[1,1] χ or {α1( ~X1), . . . , αk( ~Xk)} 6⊆ Do (PS).
The following example illustrate the concept of deontic and action consistency.
Example 5.6 Suppose we have a resource allocation agent having two actions
— send A() and send B() — each of which sends a unit of the resource respec-
tively to agents A B. To execute either of them, we need to have at least one
unit of resource, and to execute them together we need at least 2 units:
Pre(send A()) = in(X, allocator : avail rsc()) & X > 0.
Pre(send B()) = in(X, allocator : avail rsc()) & X > 0.
{send to A(), send to B()} ←֓ in(X, allocator : avail rsc()) & X < 2
Suppose the agent’s current state O is one in which avail rsc() returns 1. Then
PS = {Psend to A(),Do send to A(),
Do send to B(),Osend to B()}
is deontically consistent (there are no W and F atoms at all, and the action
preconditions are true), but not action consistent.
The deontic and action closure of a probabilistic status set PS is defined in
exactly the same way (see appendix, Definition A.3 on page 39) as in the non-
probabilistic case.
5.4 Probabilistic State Consistency
The final requirement of a feasible probabilistic status set ensures that the new
state that results after concurrently executing a set of actions is consistent with
the integrity constraints.
O satisfies the integrity constraint ψ ⇒ χ iff either O 6|=[1,1] ψ orO |=[1,1] χ.
Definition 5.7 (Probabilistic State Consistency) A probabilistic status set
PS is probabilistically state consistent w.r.t. OS iff the new state, O′S =
conc(Do (PS),OS) obtained after concurrently executing all actions of the form
Doα ∈ PS satisfies all integrity constraints.
The following example illustrates the concept of probabilistic state consistency.
Example 5.8 Suppose we have a vehicle coordination agent that tracks vehicle
on a road (line), and makes sure that two vehicles do not collide. Such an agent
may have the integrity constraint
in(X, geo : getposition(a)) & in(Y, geo : getposition(b))⇒ X 6= Y
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It may be able to perform an action move forward(a):
Pre(move forward(a)) = in(X, geo : getposition(a))
Del(move forward(a)) = in(X, geo : getposition(a))
Add(move forward(a)) = in(X+ 1, geo : getposition(a))
In a state O where geo : getposition(a) returns 200, and geo : getposition(b)
returns 201, the status set
PS = {Pmove forward(a),Domove forward(a)}
is not state consistent, as executing Do (PS) leads to where both agent a and
agent b are in position 201, violating the above integrity constraint.
5.5 Feasible Probabilistic Status Sets
The meaning of a pap (w.r.t. a given state) may be characterized via those prob-
abilistic status sets that satisfy the conditions of closure under program rules,
deontic/action consistency and probabilistic state consistency. Such probabilis-
tic status sets are said to be feasible.
Definition 5.9 (Feasible Probabilistic Status Set) Suppose PP is an agent
program and OS is an agent state. A probabilistic status set PS is feasible for
PP on OS if the following conditions hold:
(PS 1): AppPP,OS (PS) ⊆ PS (closure under the program rules);
(PS 2): PS is deontically and action consistent (deontic/action consistency);
(PS 3): PS is action closed and deontically closed (deontic/action closure);
(PS 4): PS is state consistent (state consistency).
paps may have zero, one or many feasible status sets, as seen via the following
examples.
Example 5.10 Consider the following agent program.
Psend warn(t80) ← .
Fsend warn(t80) ← .
In any agent state OS such that OS |=[1,1] Pre(send warn(t80)), the above
program cannot have any feasible probabilistic status set PS. This is because
closure under program rules requires that Psend warn(t80),Fsend warn(t80)
are both in PS, but this causes PS to violate deontic consistency.
In contrast, consider the following one-rule program for checking the power
level of surveillance equipment.
Opower warn() ← in(X, surv : powerlevel ()) & X < 2000.
16
Suppose surv : powerlevel () returns 1000 in some stateOS , and suppose power warn()
has no preconditions. If no integrity and action constraints are present, then
this pap has exactly one feasible status set, viz. for power warn(), and without
action
{Opower warn(),Do power warn(),Ppower warn()}
in OS .
Now let us consider a pap which says that one of the two agents a, b must
be warned (if it is active). Furthermore, if b is to be warned, its regular (non
emergency) channel must not be on.
Fopen ch(b) ← ¬Fopen ch(b) & Dowarn ag(b).
Dowarn ag(a) ← in(a, surv : activeagents()) & ¬Dowarn ag(b).
Owarn ag(b) ← in(b, surv : activeagents()) & ¬Dowarn ag(a).
We assume the absence of integrity constraints, and preconditions for all actions.
However, the following action constraint is present:
{warn ag(a), warn ag(b)} ←֓ .
If surv : activeagents() returns {a, b} in state OS , then the above program has
several feasible status sets:
{Fopen ch(b),Owarn ag(b),Dowarn ag(b),Pwarn ag(b)}
{Fopen ch(b),Dowarn ag(a),Pwarn ag(a)}
{Dowarn ag(a),Pwarn ag(a)}
Notice that no feasible status set contains bothDowarn ag(a) andDowarn ag(b).
5.6 Rational Probabilistic Status Sets
As seen from the above examples, feasible status sets may contain action status
atoms that are not required for feasibility. Rational probabilistic status sets
refine this definition.
Definition 5.11 (Groundedness; Rational Probabilistic Status Set)
A probabilistic status set PS is grounded if there is no probabilistic status set
PS′ 6= PS such that PS′ ⊆ PS and PS′ satisfies conditions (PS1)–(PS3) of a
feasible probabilistic status set.
PS is rational iff it is feasible and grounded.
Example 5.12 Consider the last case in Example 5.10. Only two of the listed
feasible status sets are rational, viz.
{Fopen ch(b),Owarn ag(b),Dowarn ag(b),Pwarn ag(b)} and
{Dowarn ag(a),Pwarn ag(a)}
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5.7 Reasonable Probabilistic Status Sets
As we can see from the preceding example, certain action status atoms may be
true in a rational status set even though there is no rule whose head contains
(or implies) that action status atom. The concept of a reasonable status set
(which is derived from the well known stable model semantics of logic programs
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988)) prevents this.
Definition 5.13 (Reasonable Probabilistic Status Set) Suppose PP is a
pap, OS is an agent state, and PS is a probabilistic status set.
1. If PP is a positive (i.e. B−as(r) = ∅ for all r ∈ PP), then PS is a
reasonable probabilistic status set for PP on OS , if, by definition, PS is
a rational probabilistic status set for PP on OS .
2. Otherwise, the reduct of PP w.r.t. PS and OS , denoted by redPS(PP ,OS),
is the program which is obtained from the ground instances of the rules in
PP over OS as follows.
(a) First, remove every rule r such that B−as(r) ∩ PS 6= ∅;
(b) Remove all atoms in B−as(r) from the remaining rules.
Then PS is a reasonable probabilistic status set for PP w.r.t. OS , if it
is a reasonable probabilistic status set of the program redPS(PP ,OS) with
respect to OS .
The following example illustrates the concept of a reasonable status set.
Example 5.14 Consider again the last case in Example 5.10. Only one of the
listed feasible status sets is reasonable, viz.
PS = {Dowarn ag(a),Pwarn ag(a)}
To see why this probabilistic status set is feasible, note that the reduct of PP
w.r.t. PS is:
Dowarn ag(a) ← in(a, surv : activeagents()).
whose (unique) rational status set is obviously PS.
5.8 Semantical Properties
In this section, we prove some properties about the different semantics described
above.
Proposition 5.15 (Properties of Feasible Status Sets) Let PS be a fea-
sible probabilistic status set. Then,
1. If Do (α) ∈ PS, then OS |=[1,1] Pre(α);
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2. If Pα /∈ PS, then Do (α) /∈ PS;
3. If Oα ∈ PS, then OS |=[1,1] Pre(α);
4. If Oα ∈ PS, then Fα /∈ PS.
The following theorem says that reasonable status sets are rational.
Theorem 5.16 (Reasonable Status Sets are Rational) Let PP be a prob-
abilistic agent program and OS an agent state. Every reasonable probabilistic
status set of PP on OS is a rational probabilistic status set of PP on OS .
Given any pap PP and agent state OS , we may define an operator that maps
probabilistic status sets to probabilistic status sets as follows. We use then
notation D-Cl(PS) to denote the closure of PS under the rule Oα ∈ PS ⇒
Pα ∈ PS and A-Cl(PS) to denote the closure of PS under the rules Oα ∈
PS ⇒ Doα ∈ PS and Doα ∈ PS ⇒ Oα ∈ PS.
Definition 5.17 (TPP,OS Operator) Suppose PP is a probabilistic agent pro-
gram and OS is an agent state. Then, for any probabilistic status set PS,
TPP,OS (PS) = AppPP,OS (PS) ∪D-Cl(PS) ∪A-Cl(PS).
Note that as D-Cl(PS) ⊆ A-Cl(PS), we may equivalently write this as
TPP,OS (PS) = AppPP,OS (PS) ∪A-Cl(PS).
The following property of feasible probabilistic status sets is easily seen.
Lemma 5.18 (PS as Prefixpoint of TPP,OS) Let PP be a probabilistic agent
program, OS be any agent state, and PS be any probabilistic status set. If PS
satisfies conditions (PS1) and (PS3) of feasibility, then PS is pre-fixpoint of
TPP,OS , i.e., TPP,OS (PS) ⊆ PS.
Proof: Suppose Op(α) ∈ TPP,OS (PS) = AppPP,OS (PS) ∪ A-Cl(PS).
Then we have either Op(α) ∈ AppPP,OS (PS) or Op(α) ∈ A-Cl(PS). By
condition (PS 1) defining a feasible probabilistic status set, we know that
AppPP,OS (PS) ⊆ PS. By condition (PS 3), PS = A-Cl(PS) and hence,
A-Cl(PS) ⊆ PS. Therefore, TPP,OS (PS) ⊆ PS.
The following theorem says that in the absence of integrity constraints, a
pap has a rational probabilistic status set if and only if it has a feasible one.
Theorem 5.19 (Existence of Rational Probabilistic Status Sets) Let PP
be a probabilistic agent program. If IC = ∅, then PP has a rational probabilistic
status set if and only if PP has a feasible probabilistic status set.
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6 Computing Probabilistic Status Sets of Posi-
tive paps
In this section, we present a sound and complete algorithm to compute the
unique reasonable status set of a positive pap. For this purpose, we use a variant
of the TPP,OS operator introduced earlier. This operator, denoted SPP,OS , is
defined as
SPP,OS (PS) = A-Cl(AppPP,OS (PS)).
Computationally, we may compute the operator SPP,OS using algorithm 6.1
below.
Algorithm 6.1 (SPP,OS Computation for Positive paps)
Compute-SPP,OS (OS: agent state, PS: probabilistic status set)
(⋆ the probabilistic agent program PP is positive; ⋆)
(⋆ Input: an agent state OS , and a prob. status set PS ⋆)
(⋆ Output: a deontically and action consistent set SPP,OS (PS) (if existent) ⋆)
(⋆ or “no consistent set exists” ⋆)
1. X := PS;
2. for each rule r ∈ PP
3. for each ground instance rθ of r
4. if rθ = Opα← Γ, L1, . . . , Ln and
OS |= Γ and {L1, . . . , Ln} ⊆ PS and
for every atom Op′(β) ∈ {L1, . . . , Ln} ∪ {Op(α)}
such that Op′ ∈ {P,O,Do }: OS |=[1,1] Pre(β)
5. then X := X ∪A-Cl({Opα}),
6. if X contains (Oα and Wα) or (Pα and Fα)
7. then Return “no consistent set exists”.
8. Return X.
end.
The behavior of Algorithm 6.1 is illustrated by the following example.
Example 6.1 Consider the following program, saying that whenever a (prob-
ably) enemy vehicle Y is detected, a warning message about Y is sent to a
friendly source and the agent perfroming the detection is not allowed to move.
Osend warn(Y ) ← in(F, surv :file(imagedb))&
in(Y, surv :RV identify(F))〈[0.5, 1.0],⊗ig〉&
Osend warn(X).
Fmove() ← Do send warn(X).
Osend warn(X) ← in(F, surv :file(imagedb))&
in(X, surv :RV identify(F))&
in(X, surv : enemyvehicles())) : 〈[0.5, 1.0],⊗ig〉.
20
Moreover, assume that in the current state OS , surv :file(imagedb) returns
image1, surv : identify(image1) returns the random variables 〈{t80}, {〈t80, 0.6〉}〉
and 〈{t72}, {〈t72, 0.5〉}〉, and surv : enemyvehicles() returns t80.
Now we apply Algorithm 6.1 to compute SPP,OS (OS , ∅): Step 1 sets X = ∅,
step 2 selects the first rule, while step 3 considers all ground instances (of the first
rule) whose body’s truth is checked in step 4: no instance satisfies it (because
PS is empty), so nothing happens. The same result is obtained when step 2
considers the second rule. Eventually, step 2 considers the third rule, which
satisfies the condition of step 4 with its head instantiated to Osend warn(t80).
Step 5 insertsOsend warn(t80), Do send warn(t80), Psend warn(t80) into X .
There is no deontic inconsistency, so the check n step 6 fails and then we jump
to step 8, which returns the result:
X = { Osend warn(t80),Do send warn(t80),Psend warn(t80) }.
The operator SPP,OS may be iteratively applied as follows.
S0PP,OS = ∅.
Si+1PP,OS = SPP,OS (S
i
PP,OS ).
SωPP,OS =
∞⋃
i=0
SiPP,OS .
The following theorem says that for positive paps, operator SPP,OS is mono-
tonic, continuous, and has a (unique) least fixpoint.
Lemma 6.2 (Monotonicity and Continuity of SPP,OS) Suppose PP is a
positive pap. Then the operator SPP,OS is monotone and continuous, i.e.
1. PS1 ⊆ PS2 ⇒ SPP,OS (PS1) ⊆ SPP,OS (PS2),
2. SPP,OS (
⋃∞
i=0 PS0) =
⋃∞
i=0 SPP,OS (PSi) for any chain PS0 ⊆ PS1 ⊆
PS2 ⊆ · · · of probabilistic status sets,
3. SωPP,OS is a fixpoint of SPP,OS . Moreover, it is the least fixpoint of
SPP,OS .
Proof: By the well known Knaster/Tarski theorem, 3. follows from 1. and 2..
To show 1., let PS1 ⊆ PS2. But then
AppPP,OS (PS1) ⊆ AppPP,OS (PS2),
because of the monotonicity of AppPP,OS () (see (Lloyd 1987; Apt 1990)). This
implies A-Cl(AppPP,OS (PS1)) ⊆ A-Cl(AppPP,OS (PS2)).
2. follows similarly from the continuity of AppPP,OS () and the fact that
A-Cl(
∞⋃
i=0
AppPP,OS (PSi)) =
∞⋃
i=0
A-Cl(AppPP,OS (PSi)).
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The following example shows the computation of SωPP,OS .
Example 6.3 Consider the program in Example 6.1. Applying the operator
SPP,OS iteratively, we obtain:
S0PP,OS = ∅.
S1PP,OS = {Osend warn(t80),Do send warn(t80),Psend warn(t80)}
S2PP,OS = S
1
PP,OS ∪ {Osend warn(t72),Do send warn(t72),
Psend warn(t72),Fmove()}
S3PP,OS = S
2
PP,OS = S
ω
PP,OS
The following results tell us that Lemma 5.18, which holds for arbitrary
programs, can be strengthened to the case of positive probabilistic programs.
Theorem 6.4 (Rational Probabilistic Status Sets as Least Fixpoints)
Suppose PP is a positive pap, and OS is an agent state. Then: PS is a ratio-
nal probabilistic status set if and only if PS = lfp(SPP,OS ) and PS is a feasible
probabilistic status set. Recall that lfp stands for least fixpoint.
Corollary 6.5 Let PP be a positive probabilistic agent program. Then, on
every agent state OS , the rational probabilistic status set of PP (if one exists)
is unique, i.e., if PS,PS′ are rational probabilistic status sets for PP on OS ,
then PS = PS′.
An important corollary of this theorem is that to compute a reasonable feasible
status set of a pap, all we need to do it to compute lfp(SPP,OS ). This may be
done via Algorithm Compute-lfp below.
Algorithm 6.2 (Reas. Prob. Status Set Computation for Positive paps)
Compute-lfp (TPP,OS): agent state, PP: probabilistic agent program)
(⋆ the probabilistic agent program PP is positive; ⋆)
(⋆ Input: an agent state OS , and a pap PP ⋆)
(⋆ Output: a reasonable probabilistic status set ⋆)
1. change := true; X := ∅;
2. while change do
3. newX = Compute-SPP,OS (X);
4. if newX := “no consistent set exists”
5. then return no reasonable prob. status set exists.
6. if X 6= newX then X := newX
7. else change := false.
8. end while;
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9. if X satisfies all the following conditions
10. • Doα ∈ X ⇒ O |=[1,1] Pre(α);
11. • The new state obtained by executing conc({Doα |Doα ∈ X}
12. satisfies the integrity constraints;
13. • {Doα |Doα ∈ X} satisfies the action constraints.
14. then return X
15. else return no reasonable prob. status set exists.
end.
Theorem 6.6 (Polynomial Data Complexity) Algorithm Compute-lfp has
polynomial data-complexity.
Proof: It is easy to see that the while loop of the algorithm can be executed in
polynomial time (data-complexity). Checking if X satisfies the three conditions
at the end of the algorithm are each polynomial time checks (assuming the
existence of a polynomial oracle to compute code call conditions).
The following example walks the reader through the detailed working of this
algorithm on the motivating example pap introduced earlier on in this paper.
Example 6.7 We apply the above algorithm to the program (and agent state)
of Example 6.1:
• Step 1 initialize X to ∅, i.e. to S0PP,OS , while steps 2–8 iteratively apply
the procedure which implements the operator SPP,OS .
• At the first iteration, in step 3 newX becomes S1PP,OS (shown in Exam-
ple 6.3); since there are no deontic inconsistencies, the test in step 4 fails,
and then we skip to step 6 which will assign X := newX , and then the
cycle starts again.
• At the second iteration newX becomes S2PP,OS , then it is still inconsistency-
free and different from X , so that we go on for another iteration.
• The third iteration is also the last one, since S3PP,OS = S
2
PP,OS
, and so
we skip to the tests in steps 10–13.
• In our example, the preconditions of all actions are empty and then sat-
isfied, there are not integrity constraint and then X is trivially integrity
consistant, and eventually, there are no action constraints and then X
is also action consistent. X is then returned as the (unique) reasonable
status set of the program.
6.1 Agent Programs are Probabilistic Agent Programs
In this section, we show that the concept of an agent program defined by
Eiter, Subrahmanian, and Pick (1999) is a special case of the framework de-
fined here. Hence, paps generalize the Eiter et. al. semantics. Furthermore,
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algorithm Compute-lfp may be used to compute reasonable status sets of pos-
itive agent programs. First, we show how agent programs may be captured as
paps.
Definition 6.8 Let PP be a probabilistic agent program, PS a probabilistic
status set and O a probabilistic agent state. Assume further that each random
variable contains exactly one object with probability 1. Then we can define the
following mappings:
Red1(·), which maps every probabilistic code call of the form 〈{o}, 1〉 to o:
Red1(〈{oRV}, 1〉) = o.
Red2(·), which maps annotated code call conditions to code call conditions by
simply removing the annotations and the conjunction strategy:
Red2(χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉) = χ.
We can easily extend Red2(·) to a mapping from arbitrary conjunctions of
annotated code calls to conjunctions of code calls.
Red3(·), which maps every probabilistic agent program to a non-probabilistic
agent program: it clearly suffices to define Red3(·) on probabilistic agent
rules. This is done as follows
Red3(A← Γ, L1, . . . , Ln) = A← Red2(Γ), L1, . . . , Ln.
Under the above assumptions, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 6.9 (Semantics of Agent Programs as an Instance of paps)
Suppose all random variables have the form
〈{objectRV}, 1〉.
Then: (χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 is a ground annotated code call condition, OS an agent
state)
Satisfaction: the satisfaction relations coincide, i.e.
O |=[ai1,ai2] χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 if and only if O |= Red2(χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉).
App-Operators: the App-Operators coincide, i.e.
AppRed3(PP),OS (PS) = AppPP,OS (PS),
where the operator on the left hand side is the one introduced in Defini-
tion A.4 on page 39.
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Feasibility: Feasible probabilistic status sets coincide with feasible status sets
under our reductions, i.e. PS is a feasible probabilistic status set w.r.t.
PP if and only if PS is a feasible status set w.r.t. Red3(PP).
Rational: Rational probabilistic status sets coincide with rational status sets
under our reductions, i.e. PS is a rational probabilistic status set w.r.t.
PP if and only if PS is a rational status set w.r.t. Red3(PP).
Reasonable: Reasonable probabilistic status sets coincide with reasonable sta-
tus sets under our reductions, i.e. PS is a reasonable probabilistic status
set w.r.t. PP if and only if PS is a reasonable status set w.r.t. Red3(PP).
Computation of Status Sets: The computations of probabilistic status sets
given in Algorithms 6.1 on page 20 and 6.2 on page 22 for a pap PP
reduce to the computation of status sets for Red3(PP).
Proof: The first two statements are immediate. Feasibility requires checking
conditions (PS1)–(PS4), and therefore reduces to the first two statements. Ra-
tional and reasonable status sets are handled in a completely analogous manner.
That our algorithms reduce to the non-probabilistic case under our general
assumption is trivial: the difference is only the satisfaction relation |=[1,1] which,
by the first statement, coincides with |=.
7 Probabilistic Agent Programs: Kripke Seman-
tics
The definition of a feasible status set given in Section 5 makes several simpli-
fying assumptions. First (see Definition 5.3), it assumes that an action can be
executed only if its precondition is believed by the agent to be true in the agent
state with probability 1. Second (see Definition 5.5), every action that is per-
mitted must also have a precondition that is believed to be true with probability
1. In this section, we propose a Kripke-style semantics for agent programs that
removes these conditions.
To do this, we will start by noting that in a probabilistic state Op, the agent
returns a set of random variables for each code call. Every probabilistic state
implicitly determines a set of (ordinary) states that are “compatible” with it.
We use the notation eval(a : f (d1, . . . , dn),O) to denote the result of evaluating
the code call a : f (d1, . . . , dn) w.r.t. the state O.
Definition 7.1 (Compatibility of State w.r.t. a Probabilistic State) Let
Op be a probabilistic agent state. An (ordinary) agent state O is said to be com-
patible with Op iff for every ground code call a : f (d1, . . . , dn), it is the case that
for every object o ∈ eval(a : f (d1, . . . , dn),O), there exists a random variable
(X,℘) ∈ eval(a : f (d1, . . . , dn),Op) such that o ∈ X and ℘(o) > 0, and there is
no other object o′ ∈ X such that o′ ∈ eval(a : f (d1, . . . , dn),O).
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The following example illustrates this concept.
Example 7.2 Consider a probabilistic agent state Op with only two code calls
surv : identify(image1) and surv : location(image1), which respectively return
the random variables
〈{t80, t72, t70}, {〈t80, 0.3〉, 〈t72, 0.7〉, 〈t70, 0.0〉}〉
and 〈{Loc2}, {〈Loc2, 0.8〉}〉. The agent states compatible w.r.t. Op are described
in the following table:
State Vehicle Location
1 none none
2 t80 none
3 t72 none
State Vehicle Location
4 none Loc2
5 t80 Loc2
6 t72 Loc2
The object “t70” in the first random variable has a null probability, and hence
it does not appear in any compatible agent state. In states 1–3, the location is
unknown. In states 1 and 4, the vehicle in the image is unknown.
We use the notation COS(Op) to denote the set of all ordinary agent states
that are compatible with a Op. We now define the notion of a probabilistic
Kripke structure.
Definition 7.3 (Probabilistic Kripke Structure)
A probabilistic Kripke structure is a pair (S, ℘) where S is a set of ordinary
states, and ℘ : S → [0, 1] is a mapping such that
∑
O∈S ℘(O) = 1.
Definition 7.4 (Compatible Probabilistic Kripke Structure) Let Op be
a probabilistic agent state. A coherent probabilistic Kripke structure (COS(Op), ℘)
is said to be compatible with Op iff for every ground code call a : f (d1, . . . , dn),
for every random variable (X,℘′) ∈ eval(a : f (d1, . . . , dn),Op), and for each
object o, it is the case that:
∑
o∈eval(a : f (d1,... ,dn),O)
℘(O) =
{
℘′(o) if o ∈ X
0 otherwise
By definition, two distinct objects from the same random variable cannot ap-
pear in the same compatible state. If such a random variable has a complete
probability distribution, then in any compatible Kripke structure, the sum of
the probabilities of the states containing one of its objects is equal to 1. This
means that any (compatible) agent state containing no such objects will have a
null probability, avoiding the intuitive inconsistency pointed in example 7.2.
Example 7.5 Considering the situation in example 7.2 on the previous page,
a probabilistic Kripke structure compatible with Op is 〈COS(Op), ℘〉, with the
following probability distribution:
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State Probability
1 0
2 0.1
3 0.1
State Probability
4 0
5 0.2
6 0.6
The following result says that compatible Kripke structures always exist.
Theorem 7.6 (Existence of Compatible Probabilistic Kripke Structure)
Suppose Op is a probabilistic agent state. Then there is at least one probabilistic
Kripke structure which is compatible with it.
Hence, given a probabilistic agent state Op, we use the notation PKS(Op) to
denote the set of all probabilistic Kripke structures compatible with Op—this
set is guaranteed to be nonempty by the preceding result. However, in almost
all cases, PKS(Op) contains an infinite number of elements.
Theorem 7.7 (Existence of Infinitely Many Kripke Structures) If a prob-
abilistic state Op contains at least two random variables (returned by the same
code call or by two distinct ones) containing at least one object with associated
probability 0 < p < 1, then there exist an infinite number of probabilistic Kripke
structures compatible with Op.
We are now in a position to specify what it means to execute an action in a
probabilistic Kripke structure.
Definition 7.8 (Action Execution) Suppose Op is a probabilistic agent state.
A ground action α is said to be possibly executable in Op iff there is at least one
probabilistic Kripke structure (COS(Op), ℘) ∈ PKS(Op), and an ordinary agent
state O in COS(Op) in which the precondition of α is true such that ℘(O) > 0.
In this case, O witnesses the executability of α.
We say that α is executable with probability p in Op if, by definition,
p = min{℘(O) | O ∈ COS(Op) witnesses the executability of α}.
The following example illustrates this definition.
Example 7.9 Let us consider the probabilistic agent state of examples 7.2 and 7.5
and the following actions:
α1 : Pre(α1) = in(t70, surv : identify(image1))
α2 : Pre(α2) = in(X, surv : location(image1)) & X 6= Loc2
α3 : Pre(α3) = in(Loc2, surv : location(image1)) &
in(t80, surv : identify(image1))
As stated before, the object “t70” cannot appear in any compatible agent state,
and hence the action α1 is not possibly executable. On the other hand, the
precondition of α2 requires the existence of an object other than “Loc2”, which
is known to be the only one possibly returned by the corresponding code call,
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and hence α2 is not possibly executable either. Eventually, the precondition
of α3 requires the presence of both objects “Loc2” and “t80”, which is true in
the agent state number 5 described in the above examples. As this state has a
non null probability, α3 is possibly executable and the agent state witnesses its
executability.
We are now ready to define the new probabilistic Kripke structure that
results when an action is executed in it.
Definition 7.10 (Result of Action (θ, γ)-Execution) Suppose Op is a prob-
abilistic agent state, α( ~X) is an action and γ is a ground substitution for all
variables occurring in the precondition, add, and delete list of α( ~X)θ. Let
(COS(Op), ℘) be a probabilistic Kripke structure that contains a witness O to
the possible executability of α( ~X)θ. The result of executing action α( ~X) under
substitutions θ, γ in probabilistic Kripke structure PKS(Op) = (S, ℘) is a new
Kripke structure (S′, ℘′) defined in the following way:
1. S′ = {mapα( ~X),θ,γ(O) | O ∈ S} where map is defined as follows:
map
α( ~X),θ,γ(O) =
{
apply(α( ~X), θ, γ,O) if O ∈ W
O otherwise
2. ℘′ is defined as follows:
℘′(O′) =
∑
{℘(O) | O′ = map
α( ~X),θ,γ(O)}
In the above definitions, W is the set of all witnesses in S to the executability
of α( ~X)θγ.
The result of executing action α( ~X) under substitutions θ, γ in a set K of
probabilistic Kripke structures is {S′ | S′ is obtained by executing α( ~X) under
substitutions θ, γ on S ∈ K}.
The definition causes the agent states in which α’s precondition is true to change,
while those in which α’s precondition is false stay unchanged. The probability of
each final state is the sum of the probabilities of the corresponding (old) states.
This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 7.11 Let us consider the compatible probabilistic Kripke structure in
Example 7.5, and the action erase(X):
Pre: in(X, surv : identify(image1))
Del: in(X, surv : identify(image1))
Add: ∅
The result of executing action erase(X) under substitutions {X/t80}, ǫ, is the
probabilistic Kripke structure 〈S′, ℘′〉, briefly described by the following table:
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State Vehicle Location Probability
a none none 0.1
b t72 none 0.1
c none Loc2 0.2
d t72 Loc2 0.6
i.e., the states 1 and 2 merge together yielding the new state “a” and their
probabilities are summed. Similarly, states 4 and 5 yield the new state “c”.
The following result states that our definitions are coherent.
Proposition 7.12 (Closure of Probabilistic Kripke Structures) The re-
sult of (θ, γ)-execution of an action in a probabilistic Kripke structure is also a
probabilistic Kripke structure.
Proof: Let 〈S, ℘〉 be the original Kripke structure, and 〈S′, ℘′〉 the result of
executing the action. We just need to show that
∑
{℘′(O′)|O′ ∈ S′} = 1. Using
Definition 7.10 on the preceding page:
∑
O′∈S′
℘′(O′) =
∑
O′∈S′
∑
O′=map(O)
℘(O) =
∑
O∈S
℘(O) = 1
8 p-Feasible Status Sets
Probabilistic Feasible Status Sets prevent an action from being executed unless
its precondition is known for sure to be true (which is exactly the intuitive
reading of Op |=[1,1] Pre(α), for a probabilistic agent state Op and an action
α). Analogously, an action constraint has to be checked only if its precondition
is certainly true. Finally, state consistency requires that the execution of the
actions does not corrupt the consistency of the original agent state, i.e. it has to
lead to an agent state where the integrity constraints are with 100% probability,
In this section, we define the concept of p-feasibility, where p is a probability.
p-feasibility weakens the above requirements to only requiring that preconditions
are true with probability p (or higher).
Definition 8.1 (Operator p-AppPP,Op(PS)) Suppose PP is a probabilistic
agent program, Op is a probabilistic agent state, and PS is a probabilistic status
set. Then
p-AppPP,Op(PS) = {Opα | Opα is the head of a ground instance of a rule
r in PP and:
1. B+as(r) ⊆ PS and ¬.B
−
as(r) ∩ PS = ∅;
2. For every annotated code call condition χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉 in the body of r,
it is the case that Op |=[ai1,ai2] χ : 〈[ai1, ai2],⊗〉;
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3. if Op ∈ {P,O,Do }, then the preconditions of α are true with probability
p or greater, i.e. Op |=[p,1] Pre(α);
4. for every action status atom of the form Opβ in B+as(r) such that Op ∈
{P,O,Do }, the preconditions of β are true with probability p or greater,
i.e. Op |=[p,1] Pre(β) }
The only difference between this definition and that of AppPP,OS (PS) is that
the entailment |=[1,1] is replaced by the more general |=[p,1].
Definition 8.2 (Deontic and Action p-Consistency) A probabilistic status
set PS is deontically p-consistent with respect to a probabilistic agent state Op
if, by definition, it satisfies the following rules for any ground action α:
• If Oα ∈ PS, then Wα /∈ PS.
• If Pα ∈ PS, then Fα /∈ PS.
• If Pα ∈ PS, then the preconditions of α are true with probability p or
greater, i.e. Op |=[p,1] Pre(α).
A probabilistic status set PS is action p-consistent with respect to an agent state
Op iff for every action constraint of the form
{α1( ~X1), . . . , αk( ~Xk)} ←֓ χ (3)
either Op 6|=[p,1] χ or {α1( ~X1), . . . , αk( ~Xk)} 6⊆ PS.
Generalizing probabilistic state consistency to p-probabilistic state consistency
may be done in two ways.
Definition 8.3 (Probabilistic State p-Consistency) A probabilistic status
set PS is weakly probabilistically state p-consistent w.r.t. state Op iff the new
state, Op
′
= conc(Do (PS),Op) obtained after concurrently executing all ac-
tions of the form Doα ∈ PS satisfies all integrity constraints with probability
greater than or equal to p, i.e. for every integrity constraint ψ ⇒ χ either
Op
′
6|=[p,1] ψ or Op
′
|=[p,1] χ.
We say that a probabilistic status set PS is strongly probabilistically state p-
consistent w.r.t. state Op iff the new state Op
′
satisfies the following condition:
if Op satisfies the integrity constraints with probability ≥ q (q ∈ [0, 1]) then also
Op
′
does so.
These definitions induce two types of feasibility for arbitrary probabilities p.
Definition 8.4 (Weak (resp. Strong) p-Feasibility) Let PP be an agent
program and let Op be an agent state. Then, a probabilistic status set PS is
a p-feasible probabilistic status set for PP on Op, if the following conditions
hold:
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(p-PS 1): p-AppPP,Op(PS) ⊆ PS (closure under the program rules);
(p-PS 2): PS is deontically and action p-consistent (deontic and action p-
consistency);
(p-PS 3): PS is action closed and deontically closed (deontic and action clo-
sure);
(p-PS 4): PS is weakly (resp. strong) state p-consistent (state p-consistency).
Remark 8.1 If S is a p-feasible probabilistic status set for PP on Op and
0 ≤ q ≤ p, then S is not always q-feasible. Indeed, [q, 1] ⊇ [p, 1], and then
for any formula φ Op |=[p,1] φ implies that Op |=[q,1] φ (and analogously for
6|=[p,1] and 6|=[q,1]). This means that all preconditions of actions, preconditions
of action constraints and integrity constraints which are verified for p are also
verified for q.
The problem is that p-AppPP,Op(PS) is anti-monotonic w.r.t. p, as a smaller
value for p may allow a larger set of rules to be firable. Then the closure under
the program rules is not guaranteed any more.
The following example illustrates this point.
Example 8.5 Consider the following trivial program:
Doα← .
where Pre(α) = in(a, d : f ()), and eval(d : f (),Op) = {〈{a}, 〈0.7〉〉}. Suppose
PS = ∅. Conditions p-PS 2–4 are true for any value of p. Note that 0.8-
AppPP,OS (PS) = ∅ nd hence, PS is 0.8-feasible. In contrast, we see that
0.6-AppPP,OS (PS) = {Doα} 6⊆ PS, and hence PS is not 0.6-feasible.
We can easily see that probabilistic feasibility is a particular case p-feasibility:
Proposition 8.6 Let PP be a probabilistic agent program and let Op be a con-
sistent (or equivalently 1-consistent) agent state. Then, a probabilistic status
set PS is a feasible probabilistic status set if and only if it is weakly 1-feasible
if and only if it is strongly 1-feasible.
Proof: All definitions for weak p-feasibility trivially coincide with those for
feasibility if p=1. The distinction between weak and strong p-feasibility is just in
the definition of p-consistency, and we can easily see that for p=1 they coincide,
since a probability greater or equal to 1 cannot be but equal to 1.
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8.1 p-Rational and p-Reasonable Status Sets
The notions of Rational and Reasonable Status Sets can be straightforwardly
extended to those of p-Rational and p-Reasonable status sets.
Definition 8.7 (p-Rational Status Set) A probabilistic status set PS is a
p-rational probabilistic status set, if PS is a p-feasible probabilistic status set
and there exists no probabilistic status set PS′ ⊂ PS satisfying conditions (p−
PS1)–(p− PS3) of a p-feasible probabilistic status set.
Obviously, in the case that IC = ∅ (i.e., there are no integrity constraints)
p-rational status sets are simply inclusion-minimal feasible status sets.
Definition 8.8 (p-Reasonable Probabilistic Status Set) Let PP be a prob-
abilistic agent program, let OS be an agent state, and let PS be a probabilistic
status set.
1. If PP is a positive probabilistic agent program, then PS is a p-reasonable
probabilistic status set for PP on OS , if, by definition, PS is a p-rational
probabilistic status set for PP on OS .
2. Exploiting the definition of redPS(PP,OS) (see Definition 5.13 on page 18),
PS is a p-reasonable probabilistic status set for PP w.r.t. OS , if it is a
p-reasonable probabilistic status set of the program redPS(PP,OS) with
respect to OS .
It is easy to verify that all p-reasonable probabilistic status sets are p-rational
probabilistic status sets:
Proposition 8.9 (p-Reasonable Status Sets are p-Rational) Let PP be
a probabilistic agent program and OS an agent state. Then, every p-reasonable
probabilistic status set of PP on OS is a p-rational probabilistic status set of
PP on OS .
Proof: Identical to the proof of Proposition 5.16 on page 19.
As in Section 6 on page 20, we can define a fixpoint operator and build an
algorithm on its top to compute p-reasonable status sets for positive programs.
Definition 8.10 (Operator p−SPP,OS)
p−SPP,OS (PS) = A-Cl(p−AppPP,OS (PS)),
Operator p−SPP,OS can be computed by an algorithm identical to Algo-
rithm 6.1 on page 20, but for step 4, where the entailment |=[1,1] has to be
replaced by |=[p,1]. p−SPP,OS is monotonic and continuous and has a unique
least fixpoint.
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Lemma 8.11 (Monotonicity and Continuity of p−SPP,OS) Suppose PP is
a positive pap. Then the operator p−SPP,OS is monotone and continuous, i.e.
1. PS1 ⊆ PS2 ⇒ p− SPP,OS (PS1) ⊆ p− SPP,OS (PS2),
2. p−SωPP,OS is a fixpoint of p−SPP,OS . Moreover, it is the least fixpoint
of p−SPP,OS . (We assume the iterations of p−SPP,OS are defined in the
same way as the iterations of SPP,OS).
The following result now follows immediately and has a proof similar to that of
Theorem 6.4 on page 22.
Theorem 8.12 (p-Rational Probab. Status Sets as Least Fixpoints)
Let PP be a positive probabilistic agent program, and let OS be an agent state.
Then, PS is a p-rational probabilistic status set of PP on OS , if and only if
PS = lfp(p−SPP,OS ) and PS is a p-feasible probabilistic status set.
Uniqueness of the p-reasonable status set (if it exists) holds too, and then we
can compute it by Algorithm 6.2 on page 22, replacing–as usual—the entailment
|=[1,1] with |=[p,1].
Unfortunately, the resulting algorithm is not polynomial because of the in-
tegrity constraint check in steps (11)–(12). This will be discussed in detail
in Section 8.2 below. However, when no integrity constraints are present, the
algorithm is still polynomial.
Theorem 8.13 (Polynomial Data Complexity) The problem of computing
p-reasonable probabilistic status sets of positive paps without Integrity Con-
straints (i.e., IC = ∅) has polynomial data-complexity.
8.2 Checking p-Consistency of Integrity Constraints
In this section, we provide an algorithm to check p-consistency of an integrity
constraint IC after an action have been executed in state Op, leading to a new
state Op′ assuming that all integrity constraints are true in the original state
Op. Suppose O1, . . . , ON are all states compatible with Op while O′1, . . . , O
′
N ′
are those compatible with the new state Op
′
. Let pi, p
′
i denote the probabilities
of Oi, O
′
i respectively. Then consider the following system of constraints:
minimize ΣO′
i
|=ICp
′
i such that:
(K)
∑N
i=1 pi = 1
(CK) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , E}.
∑
j:Obji∈Oj
pj = p(Obji)
(IC) ∀IC ∈ IC.1 ≥
∑
Oi:Oi|=IC
pi ≥ p
(K → K’) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N ′}.p′i =
∑
Oj :Oj
α
−→O′
i
pj
(IG) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.max{0,
∑
Objk∈Oi
p(Objk) + 1− |Oi|} ≤
≤ pi ≤ minObjk∈Oi{p(Objk)}
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The objective function captures the probability of IC being true in the new
Kripke structure. (K) and (CK) define any arbitrary compatible Kripke struc-
ture overN states w.r.t. Op (which cointains E objects), (IC) expresses the fact
that our actual state has to be p-consistent, while (K→ K’) defines the Kripke
structure obtained after the execution of action α. Eventually, (IG) gives an
upper and a lower bound to the probability of worlds (it extends the Bool ex-
pression for conjunction of events of unknown inter-relation). It is easy to see
that a straightforward implementation of this algorithm requires exponential
time and space.
9 Related Work
There has been an incredible amount of work on uncertainty in knowledge based
and database systems (Shafer and Peal 1990). However, almost all this work
assumes that we are reasoning with logic or with Bayesian nets (Koller 1998)
and most work proceeds under strong assumptions about the relationships be-
tween events (e.g. most Bayesian approaches assume conditional independence
between events, while other approaches such as (Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo
1990; Ng and Subrahmanian 1993b) assume that we have no knowledge of the
dependencies between events).
This paper introduces techniques to allow an agent developer to encode dif-
ferent assumptions about the relationships between events, when writing prob-
abilistic agent programs. The idea of conjunction strategies to facilitate this
was first introduced in the ProbView system (Lakshmanan, Leone, Ross, and
Subrahmanian 1997) in an attempt to allow users querying probabilistic rela-
tional databases to express in their query, their knowledge of the dependencies
between events. Later, (Dekhtyar and Subrahmanian 1997) extended the use
of conjunction and disjunction strategies to the case of logic programs. In this
paper, the idea of conjunction strategies are applied in the context of deontic-
logic based agent programs. We are not aware of any extant work on allowing
flexible dependency assumptions in the context of logics and actions.
Research on epistemic logic (e.g., (Morgenstern 1988; Moore 1985; Kraus and
Lehmann 1988)) enables reasoning about what is known and is not known at
a given time. However, epistemic logics have not been used as a representation
in decision making and in automated planning systems, perhaps, because the
richness of these languages makes efficient reasoning very difficult. In contrast,
our framework has polynomial data complexity.
Halpern and Tuttle (1992) study the semantics of reasoning about dis-
tributed systems when uncertainty is present. They develop a logic where a
process has knowledge about the probability of events which facilitates decision-
making by the process. We, on the other hand, consider probabilistic states,
and as argued in (Dix, Subrahmanian, and Pick 2000) this also allows us to
reason about probabilistic beliefs, i.e. probabilities are assigned to the agents’
beliefs about events, rather than to the events themselves. That is, in Halpern’s
work (Halpern and Tuttle 1992), the beliefs of the agent are CERTAIN, but in
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our framework, the beliefs of the agent may themselves be uncertain (with the
phenomenon when they are certain being a special case of our framework).
Poole (1997) presented a framework that allows a natural specification of
multi-agent decision problems. It extends logic with a new way to handle and
think about non-determinism and uncertainty in terms of independent choices
made by various agents, including nature and a logic program that gives the
consequence of choices. It has general independence assumption. This work is
more expressive than ours, but its generality leads to complexity problems and
to difficulties in using the framework.
Haddawy (1991) developed a logic that allows to write sentences that de-
scribe uncertainty in the state of the world, uncertainty of action effects, com-
bine possibility and chance, distinguish between truth and chance and express
information about probability distributions. He uses model theoretic semantics
and demonstrates how his logic can be used to specification various reasoning
and planning problems. The main purpose of the specification is to prove cor-
rectness, and not for programming of agents. Kushmerick, Hanks, and Weld
(1995) model uncertainty about the true state of the world with a probability
distribution over the state space. Actions have uncertain effects, and each of
these effects is also modeled with a probability distribution. They seek plans
whose probability of success exceeds the threshold. They describe BURIDAN,
an implemented algorithm for probabilistic planning. In contrast, we focus on
programming agents, rather than on how agents will construct plans. Other
researchers extended Kushmerick et al.’s model to increase the efficiency of the
planning (Haddawy, Doan, and Goodwin 1996) or to more realistic domains
(Doan 1996). Thie´baux, Hertzberg, Shoaff, and Schneider (1995) developed a
framework for anytime generation of plans under incomplete and ambiguous
knowledge and actions with alternative and context dependent effects.
Kaelbling, Littman, and Cassandra (1998) propose using partially observable
Markov decisionprocesses (POMDPs) for planning under uncertainty. Similar
to BURIDAN they use a probability distributions over states to express uncer-
tainty about the situation of the agent. They also consider the problem of
non-deterministic actions and getting feedback from the environment which we
mentioned only briefly.
10 Conclusions
Agents are programs that autonomously react to changes in their environment
by taking appropriate actions. In (Eiter, Subrahmanian, and Pick 1999), the
authors have proposed a framework within which agents may be built on top
of an existing body of legacy code, and/or on top of specialized data structures
appropriate for the intended functionality of the agent being built.
However, there are an increasing number of applications where agents are
uncertain about what is true in their state (or environment). Such situations
occur all the time in image identification programs, in programs that predict
future events (such as battlefield events, stock market events, etc.), and in
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scenarios where an agent a attempts to predict what an agent b will do.
In this paper, we first introduce the concept of a probabilistic code call,
which is a mechanism to describe uncertain application program interfaces for
arbitrary functions over arbitrary data types. Based on this concept, we define
probabilistic agent programs— sets of rules that encode the operating principles
of an agent. Such rules encode the probabilistic conditions under which an agent
is obliged to take some actions, permitted to take some actions and/or forbidden
to take some actions.
We then provide two broad classes of semantics for such “probabilistic agents.”
In the first class of semantics, actions that are permitted, obligatory or done,
must have preconditions that are true with 100% probability in the current
agent state. In the second class of semantics (which use probabilistic variants
of Kripke structures), the actions that are permitted, obligatory or done, must
have preconditions that are true with at least a given probability. This latter
class of semantics allows reasoning by cases. We provide complexity arguments
showing that though the second family of semantics is perhaps epistemologically
more appealing than the first, the second family of semantics is also computa-
tionally more complex.
Finally, the paper includes algorithms to compute the semantics of proba-
bilistic agent programs, as long as such programs are negation free.
Future work on probabilistic agent programs will focus on computing the
semantics of paps that contain negation. A detailed study of computational
complexity is also envisaged. We are also interested in identifying polynomially
computable fragments of paps and implementing them on top of the current
IMPACT implementation. Last, but not least, IMPACT has been used in a
battlefield monitoring application where there is considerable uncertainty in
predicting tactical enemy movements. We hope to build an application of paps
addressing this problem, once the implementation of paps is complete.
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A Agent Programs without Uncertainty
The following definitions are taken from (Eiter, Subrahmanian, and Pick 1999).
A.1 Feasible, Rational and Reasonable Semantics
Definition A.1 (Status Set) A status set is any set S of ground action status
atoms over S. For any operator Op ∈ {P,Do ,F,O,W}, we denote by Op(S)
the set Op(S) = {α | Op(α) ∈ S}.
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Definition A.2 (Deontic and Action Consistency) A status set S is called
deontically consistent, if, by definition, it satisfies the following rules for any
ground action α:
• If Oα ∈ S, then Wα /∈ S
• If Pα ∈ S, then Fα /∈ S
• If Pα ∈ S, then OS |= ∃∗Pre(α), where ∃∗Pre(α) denotes the existential
closure of Pre(α), i.e., all free variables in Pre(α) are governed by an
existential quantifier. This condition means that the action α is in fact
executable in the state OS .
A status set S is called action consistent, if S,OS |= AC holds.
Besides consistency, we also wish that the presence of certain atoms in S
entails the presence of other atoms in S. For example, if Oα is in S, then we
expect that Pα is also in S, and if Oα is in S, then we would like to have Doα
in S. This is captured by the concept of deontic and action closure.
Definition A.3 (Deontic and Action Closure) The deontic closure of a sta-
tus S, denoted D-Cl(S), is the closure of S under the rule
If Oα ∈ S, then Pα ∈ S
where α is any ground action. We say that S is deontically closed, if S =
D-Cl(S) holds.
The action closure of a status set S, denoted A-Cl(S), is the closure of S
under the rules
If Oα ∈ S, then Doα ∈ S
If Doα ∈ S, then Pα ∈ S
where α is any ground action. We say that a status S is action-closed, if S =
A-Cl(S) holds.
The following straightforward results shows that status sets that are action-
closed are also deontically closed, i.e.
Definition A.4 (Operator AppP,OS (S)) Suppose P is an agent program, and
OS is an agent state. Then, AppP,OS (S) is defined to be the set of all ground
action status atoms A such that there exists a rule in P having a ground instance
of the form r : A← L1, . . . , Ln such that
1. B+as(r) ⊆ S and ¬.B
−
as(r) ∩ S = ∅, and
2. every code call χ ∈ B+cc(r) succeeds in OS , and
3. every code call χ ∈ ¬.B−cc(r) does not succeed in OS , and
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4. for every atom Op(α) ∈ B+(r) ∪ {A} such that Op ∈ {P,O,Do }, the
action α is executable in state OS .
Note that part (4) of the above definition only applies to the “positive”
modes P,O,Do . It does not apply to atoms of the form Fα as such actions are
not executed, nor does it apply to atoms of the form Wα, because execution of
an action might be (vacuously) waived, if its prerequisites are not fulfilled.
Our approach is to base the semantics of agent programs on consistent and
closed status sets. However, we have to take into account the rules of the
program as well as integrity constraints. This leads us to the notion of a feasible
status set.
Definition A.5 (Feasible Status Set) Let P be an agent program and let OS
be an agent state. Then, a status set S is a feasible status set for P on OS , if
the following conditions hold:
(S1): (closure under the program rules) AppP,OS (S) ⊆ S;
(S2) (deontic and action consistency) S is deontically and action consistent;
(S3) (deontic and action closure) S is action closed and deontically closed;
(S4) (state consistency) O′S |= IC, where O
′
S = apply(Do (S),OS) is the
state which results after taking all actions in Do (S) on the state OS .
Definition A.6 (Groundedness; Rational Status Set) A status set S is
grounded, if there exists no status set S′ 6= S such that S′ ⊆ S and S′ sat-
isfies conditions (S1)–(S3) of a feasible status set.
A status set S is a rational status set, if S is a feasible status set and S is
grounded.
Definition A.7 (Reasonable Status Set) Let P be an agent program, let
OS be an agent state, and let S be a status set.
1. If P is a positive agent program, then S is a reasonable status set for P
on OS , if and only if S is a rational status set for P on OS .
2. The reduct of P w.r.t. S and OS , denoted by redS(P ,OS), is the program
which is obtained from the ground instances of the rules in P over OS as
follows.
(a) First, remove every rule r such that B−as(r) ∩ S 6= ∅;
(b) Remove all atoms in B−as(r) from the remaining rules.
Then S is a reasonable status set for P w.r.t. OS , if it is a reasonable
status set of the program redS(P ,OS) with respect to OS .
40
B Proofs of Theorems
Proof: (of Proposition 5.15)
1. Suppose Doα ∈ PS. Then, as PS is feasible, we know that PS =
A-Cl(PS), and hence Pα ∈ PS. As PS is feasible, and hence deonti-
cally consistent, the third condition of deontic consistency specifies that
α’s precondition is true in state OS .
2. This follows immediately because as PS is feasible, we havePS = A-Cl(PS).
The second condition defining A-Cl(PS), when written in contrapositive
form, states that Pα /∈ PS implies that Doα /∈ PS.
3. As PS is feasible, PS = A-Cl(PS). The first condition specifyingA-Cl(PS)
allows us to infer that Oα ∈ PS implies that Doα ∈ PS. The result fol-
lows immediately from part (1) of this proposition.
4. From the above argument, as PS = A-Cl(PS), we can conclude that
Oα ∈ PS implies that Pα ∈ PS. By the deontic consistency requirement,
Fα /∈ PS.
Proof: (of Theorem 5.16)
In order to show that a reasonable probabilistic status set PS of PP is a rational
status of PP, we have to verify (1) that PS is a feasible probabilistic status set
and (2) that PS is grounded.
Since PS is a reasonable probabilistic status set of PP, it is a rational
probabilistic status set of PP ′ = redPS(PP ,OS), i.e., a feasible and grounded
probabilistic status set of PP ′. Since the conditions (PS2)–(PS4) of the defi-
nition of feasible probabilistic status set depend only on PS and OS but not on
the program, this means that for showing (1) it remains to check that (PS1)
(closure under the program rules) is satisfied.
Let thus r be a ground instance of a rule from PP . Suppose the body
B(r) of r satisfies the conditions 1.–4. of (PS1). Then, by the definition of
redPS(PP ,OS), we have that the reduct of the rule r, obtained by removing all
literals of B−as(r) from the body, is in PP
′. Since PS is closed under the rules
of PP ′, we have H(r) ∈ PS. Thus, PS is closed under the rules of PP , and
hence (PS1) is satisfied. As a consequence, (1) holds.
For (2), we suppose PS is not grounded, i.e., that some smaller PS′ ⊂ PS
satisfies (PS1)–(PS3) for PP, and derive a contradiction. If PS′ satisfies (PS1)
for PP, then PS′ satisfies (PS1) for PP ′. For, if r is a rule from PP ′ such
that 1.–4. of (PS1) hold for PS′, then there is a ground rule r′ of PP such
that r is obtained from r′ in the construction of redPS(PP,OS) and, as easily
seen, 1.–4. of (PS1) hold for PS′. Since PS′ satisfies (PS1) for PP, we have
H(r) ∈ PS′. It follows that PS′ satisfies (PS1) for PP ′. Furthermore, since
(PS2) and (PS3) do no depend on the program, also (PS2) and (PS3) are
satisfied for PS′ w.r.t. PP ′. This means that PS is not a rational probabilistic
status set of PP ′, which is the desired contradiction.
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Thus, (1) and (2) hold, which proves the result.
Proof: (of Theorem 5.19)
By definition of rationality, we know that if PS is a rational status set of PP
then it must be a feasible probabilistic status set as well.
Suppose PP has a feasible probabilistic status set. Then the set of all
feasible probabilistic status sets of PP on OS has a non-empty set of inclusion-
minimal elements. Indeed, from the grounding of the probabilistic agent pro-
gram, we can remove all rules which violate the conditions 2.-4. of the operator
AppPP,OS (PS), and can remove literals involving code calls from the remaining
rules. Moreover, the deontic and action closure conditions can be incorporated
into the program via rules. Thus, we end up with a set T of propositional
clauses, whose models are feasible probabilistic status sets of PP. Since PP
has a feasible probabilistic status set, T has a model, i.e., an assignment to the
propositional atoms which satisfies all clauses in T . Now, each satisfiable set
of clauses in a countable language posseses at least one minimal model (w.r.t.
inclusion, i.w., a ⊆-minimal set of atoms is assigned the value true); this can be
shown applying the same technique which proves that every such set of clauses
can be extended to a maximal satisfiable set of clauses. Thus, T has at least
one minimal model. As easily seen, any such model is a minimal feasible prob-
abilistic status set of PP.
Suppose now PS′ is one of the minimal feasible probabilistic status sets of
PP on OS . Then (as we show below) PS
′ is grounded, and hence a rational
probabilistic status set.
To show that PS′ is grounded, we need to show that PS′ satisfies conditions
(PS 1)–(PS 3) of the definition of feasible probabilistic status set—this is true
because PS′ is feasible. In addition, we need to show that no strict subset PS⋆
of PS satisfies conditions (PS 1)–(PS 3).
Suppose there is a strict subset PS⋆ of PS satisfying conditions (PS 1)–
(PS 3). Then, as IC = ∅, PS⋆ also satisfies condition (PS 4) of the definition
of feasibility, and hence PS⋆ is a feasible probabilistic status set. But this
contradicts the inclusion minimality of PS′, and hence, we may infer that PS′
has no strict subset PS⋆ of PS satisfying conditions (PS 1)–(PS 3). Thus, PS′
is grounded, and we are done.
Proof: (of Theorem 7.6)
For each random variable Vi = (Xi, ℘i) returned by some ground code call
condition in the probabilistic state Op, let us define its normalized version V ′i =
(X ′i, ℘
′
i) where:
X ′i = {x | x ∈ Xi and ℘i(x) > 0} ∪ {ǫ |
∑
x∈Xi
℘i(x) < 1};
℘′i(x) =
{
℘i(x) if x ∈ X ′i \ {ǫ}
1−
∑
x∈Xi
℘i(x) if x = ǫ and ǫ ∈ X ′i
i.e., we delete the zero-probability elements and add the extra one ǫ (which
stands for “none of the above”) whenever the distribution ℘i is incomplete.
Now we can see that each tuple x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 in the Cartesian product
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X ′ = X ′1 × · · · × X
′
n corresponds to a distinct compatible state O w.r.t. O
p.
In O, a ground code call returns an object o iff in the probabilistic state Op it
returns a variable Vi such that xi = o. Let associate to each state O of this kind
the value
℘∗(O) = ℘′1(x1) · · ·℘
′
n(xn)
and set ℘∗(O) = 0 for all the other states. We can easily verify that 〈COS(Op), ℘∗〉
is a compatible probabilistic Kripke structure for Op: for each random variable
Vi returned in state Op and each object o ∈ Xi if ℘i(o) = 0 then o 6∈ X ′, so it
could appear only in the zero-probability states; otherwise:
∑
o∈O
℘∗(O) =
∑
x∈X′,xi=o
n∏
j=0
℘′j(xj) = ℘
′
i(o)
∑
x∈X′,xi=o
∏
j 6=i
℘′j(xj) = ℘
′
i(o) = ℘i(o)
Both cases satisfy the condition for compatibility. Finally, it is easy to verify
that 〈COS(Op), ℘∗〉 is really a probabilistic Kripke structure:
∑
O
℘∗(O) =
∑
x∈X′
n∏
j=0
℘′j(xj) =
∑
x1∈X′1
℘′1(x1) = 1
Proof: (of Theorem 7.7)
Let us consider the compatible Kripke structure described in the proof of Propo-
sition 7.6 on page 27, and let us assume that V1 and V2 are the variables required
in the thesis. The corresponding completed versions V ′1 and V
′
2 will then contain
at least two non zero-probability objects (one of them could be the extra object
ǫ), respectively a1, b1 and a2, b2. Now let choose an arbitrary real number δ
such that:
0 ≤ δ ≤ min
x∈{a1,b1},y∈{a2,b2}
{℘′1(x)℘
′
2(y)}
We can build a Kripke structure 〈COS(Op), ℘δ〉, where ℘δ is defined in the same
way as ℘∗ but replacing ℘′1(x1)℘
′
2(x2) by φ(x1, x2), which in turn is defined in
the following way:
φ(x1, x2) =


℘′1(x1)℘
′
2(x2)− δ if 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ {〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉}
℘′1(x1)℘
′
2(x2) + δ if 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ {〈a1, b2〉, 〈b1, a2〉}
℘′1(x1)℘
′
2(x2) otherwise
It is easy to verify that it is a compatible Kripke structure. Since δ can be
arbitrarily chosen within a non-point interval, we can obtain an infinite number
of distinct compatible Kripke structures.
Proof: (of Theorem 8.12)
(⇒) Suppose PS = lfp(SPP,OS ) a rational probabilistic status set of PP on
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OS . Then, PS is feasible by definition of rational probabilistic status set. By
Lemma 5.18, PS is a pre-fixpoint of SPP,OS . Since SPP,OS is monotone, it
has by the Knaster-Tarski Theorem a least pre-fixpoint, which coincides with
lfp(SPP,OS ) (see (Apt 1990; Lloyd 1987)). Thus, lfp(SPP,OS ) ⊆ PS. Clearly,
lfp(SPP,OS ) satisfies (PS1) and (PS3); moreover, lfp(SPP,OS ) satisfies (PS2),
as PS satisfies (PS2) and this property is hereditary. By the definition of
rational probabilistic status set, it follows lfp(SPP,OS ) = PS.
(⇐) Suppose PS = lfp(SPP,OS ) is a feasible probabilistic status set. Since
every probabilistic status set PS′ which satisfies (PS1)–(PS3) is a pre-fixpoint
of SPP,OS and lfp(SPP,OS ) is the least prefix point, PS
′ ⊆ PS implies PS =
PS′. It follows that PS is rational.
Notice that in case of positive programs, lfp(SPP,OS ) always satisfies the
conditions (PS1) and (PS3) of a feasible probabilistic status set (i.e., all closure
conditions), and thus is a rational probabilistic status set if it satisfies (PS2) and
(PS4), i.e., the consistency criteria. The uniqueness of the rational probabilistic
status set is immediate from the previous theorem.
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